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NOTES
FAIR USE NO LONGER:
HOW THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT
ACT BARS FAIR USE OF DIGITALLY STORED
COPYRIGHTED WORKS
DENIS T. BROGAN
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to
confer upon authors an exclusive right to their writings for
limited times.' This exclusive right, however, is further limited
1 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating interests of copyright to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. . .'). See Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (asserting that copyright
achieves important public purpose and intended to motivate creative activity of authors
and inventors through rewards, yet allows public access after limited period of exclusive
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by the "fair use" exception to copyright protection.2 Originally a
judge-made doctrine, 3 the doctrine of fair use is now codified
under § 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act. 4 This exception permits
the reasonable appropriation of a work, provided that the
material used from the copyrighted work in some way benefits
the public, without substantially impairing the present or
control has expired); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(stating rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors fair return for
their labors); Donaldson v. Beckett, 98 Eng. Rep. 257, 262 (1774) (overruling Milar v.
Taylor, Eng. Rep. 201 (1769)). See generally Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation
of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L.
REV. 1119, 1156-71, 1188-91 (1983); Francine Crawford, Pre-Constitutional Copyright
Statutes, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 11, 11-37 (1975) (discussing pre-Revolutionary War
copyright laws in American thirteen colonies that were governed by 1710 Statute of
Anne); Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution,
17 GEO. L.J. 109 (1929).
2 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (arguing "[Ifrom
the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials
has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, '[tlo promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts. . .'") (citations omitted); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-
66 (1976) (explaining "Itihe claim that a defendant's acts constituted a fair use rather
than an infringement has been raised as a defense in innumerable copyright actions over
the years, and there is ample case law recognizing the existence of the doctrine and
applying it."); H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY, 260 (1944) (defining
fair use as "a privilege in others than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner without his consent"); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 13.05 [BI[3] (reviewing Supreme Court decisions on
scope of fair use doctrine).
3 See Campbell, 510 U.S., at 576 (claiming "although the First Congress enacted [the]
initial copyright statute, ... without any reference to doctrine of 'fair use,' it was
recognized by American courts nonetheless." ); see also SunTrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (111h Cir. 2001) (stating fair use was originally judge-
made affirmative defense); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The fair use
doctrine was initially developed by courts as an equitable defense to copyright
infringement").
4 17 U.S.C. § 107 states in full:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies and phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use[,] the factors to be considered
shall include[:]
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Section 107 was intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976).
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potential economic value of the first work.5 The courts have
viewed it as a "safety valve" that accommodates the exclusive
rights conferred upon authors by copyright law while balancing
them against the freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed
by the First Amendment. 6
The recent explosion of digital technology, however, has
enabled authors to digitally store their works and encrypt them,
so that making a fair use of a digitally stored and encrypted work
is impossible without first decrypting the work.7 Granted, this is
not a problem for a work that is not digitally stored, such as a
book or magazine, because expression fixed in those types of
media can be accessed easily and copied even more readily, most
5 See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtshaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (1986) ("There are no
absolute rules as to how much of a copyrighted work may be copied and still be considered
fair use"); ROBERT A. GORMAN AND JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND
MATERIALS, 609 (Fifth Edition 1999); Willajeanne F. McLean, All's Not Fair in Art and
War: A look at the Fair Use Defense after Rogers v. Koons, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 373, 376
(1993) (explaining four factors used to determine fair use).
6 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)
(reminding that Framers intended copyright to be engine of free expression by
establishing marketable right to the use of one's expression; thus copyright supplied
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
546 (stating essential thrust of First Amendment is prohibiting improper restraints on
voluntary public expression of ideas by shielding individuals who want to speak or
publish when others wish them to be quiet and that this freedom not to speak publicly has
same ultimate end); Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing that
copyright, especially right of first publication, are valuable to First Amendment);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(explaining "[the doctrine] has been viewed by courts as a safety valve that accommodates
the exclusive rights conferred by copyright with the freedom of expression guaranteed by
the First Amendment"); Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348
(1968) (stating copyright law is in place to protect expression and ideas of authors by
encouraging and protecting intellectual labor). See generallyWooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 714 (1977) (Burger, C.J.) (stating freedom of thought and expression "includes both
the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all"); Sobel, Copyright
and the Pirst Amendment: A Gathering Storm, 19 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SYMP. 43, 78
(1971); Comment, Copyright and the First Amendment: Where Lies the Public Interest
59 TULANE L. REV. 135, 135 (1984) (arguing copyright law balances authors' interests in
their writings and society's interest in flow of ideas and information).
7 See Amy Harmon, New Economy: With Music Widely Available Online, Is It Now
Time To Tighten Copyright Laws Or Consider Rewriting Them To Reflect RealityZ N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at C4 (chronicling case of company found guilty of copying some
80,000 CD's onto its own computers for purpose that did not fall under "fair use" doctrine,
and arguing existing copyright law did not envision mass scale copying made possible by
Internet); Randall E. Stross, Chil, Hollywood, Chill: Let The People Watch What They
Want When They Want To, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 2, 200 at 46 (warning that
as digital media becomes more prominent, loss of noncommercial "fair use" is going to be
more manifest). Cf Amy Harmon, Judge Rules Against MP3 On CD Copying, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 7, 2000, at C1 (discussing ruling that online music start-up company
'willfully infringed" copyrights by distributing music through its music trading service
website); Amy Harmon, Technology Briefing E-Commerce; Copyright Measure
Introduced, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 27, 2000, at Cl (reporting introduction of bill in United
States House of Representatives that would legalize online music swapping).
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commonly by means of a photocopier.8 Nor has such a problem
arisen in copyright law hitherto - although before the explosion
of the Internet in the mid-to-late 1990s, the invention of the
photocopier, ubiquitously known as the "Xerox" machine, allowed
copying to be performed so much more cheaply and readily that
courts struggled to apply the fair use doctrine to this new
technology because for the first time copying amounted to much
more than just a few handwritten copies of articles.9
Consequently, in order to access a book or magazine stored
entirely in digital form, a user must either (a) possess decryption
technology on his or her own that would enable a fair use to be
made of the digitally stored copyrighted work,10 or (b) pay the
copyright owner every time access to the so stored work is
desired (a "pay-per-use" system), even if the user intends only to
make a fair use of the work.11 The 1998 Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (the "DMCA"), however, expressly banned the
distribution of decryption or "anti-circumvention" technology,
8 See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1995)
(concluding fair use defense did not apply to firm-wide photocopying of scientific journal
articles for use in research, where defendant's purpose was to avoid costs of obtaining
multiple copies of scientific journals, thereby causing substantial damage to value of
copyrights).
9 The dictum in Williams vs. Wilkins, 487 F.2d 1349, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973) asserted, "it
is almost unanimously accepted that a scholar can make a handwritten copy of an entire
copyrighted article for his own use." The Second Circuit in American Geophysical
articulated that it did not mean to imply that such copying would necessarily have been
fair use. See American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 924n.10. The court quoted 3 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 1305[E][4][a] at 13-229, which reported that "there is no reported case on
the question of whether a single handwritten copy of all or substantially all of a book or
other protected work made for the copier's own private use is an infringement or fair use."
10 See Amy Harmon, Free Speech Rights For Computer Code; Suit Tests Power of
Media Concerns to Control Access to Digital Content, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 31, 2000, at C1
(citing critics of law who argue that "even time honored 'fair use' privileges like quoting
from a novel in an essay of literary criticism or showing a movie snippet on a televised
review could become illegal or even technically impossible since devising a way to do so
would be illegal."); Amy Harmon, Movie Studios Seek to Stop DVD Copies, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul.18, 2000, at C6 (highlighting first day of case deciding whether decryption technology
banned by Digital Millennium Copyright Act was protected by doctrine of fair use).
II See David Nimmer, A RiT on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copright Act,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 741 (2000) (concluding that '[i]n the event that future technology
and business models do indeed converge to produce such a pay-per-use world, then the
structure of section 1201.. . cannot meaningfully serve as the tool to defeat universal
pay-per-use and de facto perpetual protection."); John R. Therien, Exorcising the Specter
of a "Pay-Per-Use" Society: Toward Preserving Fair Use and the Public Domain in the
Digital Age, 16 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 979, 1009-1010 (2001) (arguing that DMCA acts to
restrict fair use by protecting technology which could lead us to "pay-per-use" society); see
also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies Of Dissemination,
101 COLUM. L. REV 1613, 1632-1633 (2001) (discussing access controls and arguments for
and against "pay-per-use" systems).
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precluding one from navigating around digital firewalls - even if
one wished merely to access encrypted works to make a fair
(albeit digital) use of that work.12
As we move rapidly into the digital world of the twenty-first
century, we stand poised to enter what most likely will become a
world in which massive numbers of copyrighted works (and
colossal amounts of information in general) are stored almost
exclusively in digital form.13 Electronic storage of books cuts
down on library shelf space, reduces costs, saves paper, and
allows quick and easy access to and retrieval of information from
electronic search engines and databases via the Internet. Better
yet, a copy of a digitally stored work is not any less true to the
original, i.e., with photocopies of books or pages from books, or
copies of movies recorded on magnetic tapes, each subsequent
copy made from a copy of the original deteriorates in quality.14
Digital copies, however, are exact replicas of the original and do
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(2001); NIMMER, supra note 11, at 683 (quoting House
Committee on Commerce that Congress has achieved constitutional objectives for
copyright by regulating information use - not dvices or means - and by ensuring
appropriate balance between interests of copyright owners and information users); see
also H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 22 (1998) (concluding that digital environment poses
unique threat to rights of copyright owners, and so protection against devices that
undermine copyright interests, i.e., decryption devices, is warranted). See generally
Eddan Elizafon Katz, RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc. & Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Reimerdes, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 54-56 (providing overview of DMCA and
its various provisions).
13 See Amy Harmon, Ideas & Trends, Copyright and Copying Wrongs: A Web
Rebalancing Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 10, 2000, § 4, at 4. (noting "[als books and movies
follow music from the physical to the digital realm, some legal experts argue that a new
balance must be struck between copyright holders and the users of their works if
copyright is to continue to drive economic and creative development."); see also Kristi
Nelson, Exhibit HaLls Transformed Into High Tech Haven ELECTRONIC MEDIA April 16,
2001 (discussing wealth of digital technology that is now available to media and news
companies); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 520
(1999) (arguing that "... anti-device provisions of DMCA should be clarified and a more
minimalist approach taken to the regulation of technologies with circumvention-enabling
uses so that the ambiguity and overbreadth of the existing provisions will not cause harm
to innovation and competition in the information technology sector.").
14 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 309 (discussing
major movie studios exploration of distribution to home market in digital format, which
offered higher audio and visual quality and greater longevity than video cassette tapes
and that this technology, known today as DVD, brought increased risk of piracy by virtue
of fact that digital files, unlike video cassettes, can be copied with degradation from
generation to generation) (emphasis added); infra, note 79; see also David A. Petteys, The
Freedom to Link" The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Impicates the First
Amendment in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 25 SEATTLE UNIV. L. R. 287,
(arguing that Internet provides both excellent opportunities and major difficulties with
regards to dissemination of information, particularly in realm of copyrighted material).
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not experience any significant decay in quality or value.15 This
feature enables copy after digital copy to be made and passed
along the Internet while the sender retains possession of a copy
that is virtually identical to the original document in all
respects.16 Thus, while digital storage and retrieval systems may
be an enormous technological gain for humankind, contributing
to the "marketplace of ideas,"17 they pose a unique problem for
authors of copyrighted works who do not want their works
misappropriated or overtly stolen in their entirety over the
Internet. 18
Although there always will exist books and other tangible
media in which copyrighted works can and will be stored, this
Note rests on the prospect that digital technology will prove to be
the medium of choice in the twenty-first century. As a result, it
addresses the foreseeable decline, and indeed death, of "fair use"
as a defense to copyrighted works stored in a digital medium. In
fact, as the 1976 Copyright Act (as amended by the 1998 DMCA)
reads today, fair use is point blank unavailable as a defense to
15
[11n principle, the digital world is very different. Once a decryption program
like DeCSS is written, it quickly can be sent all over the world Every recipient
is capable not only of decrypting and perfectly copying plaintiffs copyrighted
DVDs, but also of retransmitting perfect copies of DeCSS and thus enabling
every recipient to do the same. They likewise are capable of transmitting
perfect copies of the decrypted DVD. The process potentially is exponential
rather than linear. Indeed, the difference is illustrated by comparison of two
epidemiological models describing the spread of different kinds of disease.
Universal City Studios, 111 F. Supp. at 331 (citations omitted).
16 See Universal City Studios, 111 F.Supp. at 331; infra, note 84; see also Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr. The Death of Copyright Digital Technology, Private Copying, And The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act. 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 824 (2001) (commenting that today's
technology allows individuals to make near perfect copies of digital material quickly and
efficiently).
17 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(discussing marketplace of ideas standard); see also Reno v. A.C.L.U. 521 U.S. 844, 885
(1997) (applying "marketplace of ideas" standard to strike down regulation of speech on
Internet); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 850 (1995)
(upholding university funding of Catholic student newspaper because it promoted
marketplace of ideas).
18 See RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, *19 (W.D.
Wash. 2000) (describing plaintiff RealNetworks' "Copy Switch" located on its RealServer
computer, which permitting copying of works that copyright owners made available
through RealNetworks for purpose of having them copied); Lunney, Jr., supra note 16, at
818 (noting this copying technology creates potential for widespread private copying,
which although individually trivial, widespread private copying in aggregate could
radically reduce incentive to create any given work of authorship); see also Neil
Weinstock Netane, From the Dead Sea Scrolls to the Digital Millennium; Recent
Developments in Copyright Law, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J 19, 22 (2000) (discussing
technology used by defendants in RealNetworks).
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making use of a digitally stored and encrypted Digital Versatile
Disk (DVD), Compact Disc (CD) or electronic book (e-book).19
This Note focuses, therefore, on the unavailability of fair use as a
defense, and the potential problem it shall pose in this new
century, especially in light of First Amendment considerations. 20
Part I outlines the anti-circumvention measures adopted by
Congress in the 1976 Copyright Act as amended by the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, which effectively proscribe the use of
fair use as a defense by banning measures necessary to access
such a work in the first place. Part I examines the Congressional
intent and purposes of the pertinent provisions as well. Part II
discusses the rise of fair use as a defense to a charge of
unauthorized copying before the explosion of digital technology,
and hypothesizes an application of the fair use doctrine to new
technologies including photocopiers and digital storage and
retrieval systems. Part III examines case law, including one of
the first cases to be brought under the DMCA,21 and looks at
arguments in favor of rewriting the copyright laws; these
arguments find support in the contention that the Internet and
digital technology are changing faster than Congress can tailor
its laws to balance the Constitutional requirement to benefit the
public with protecting the property interests of authors.22
19
The prohibition contained in subparagraph (A) shall not apply to persons who
are users of a copyrighted work which is in a particular class of works, if such
persons are, or are likely to be in the succeeding [three]-year period, adversely
affected by virtue of such prohibition in their ability to make noninfringing
uses of that particular class of works under this title...
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B).
20 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (Burger, C.J.) (stating freedom of
thought and expression "includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all"); Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (1981) (recognizing that
copyright, especially right of first publication, serve value to First Amendment). See
generally Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm 19 COPYRIGHT
L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 78 (1971); Comment, Copyright and the First Amendment: Where
Lies the Public Interest 59 TUL. L. REV. 135 (1984) (discussing First Amendment
concerns in relation to copyright); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment,
70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1970).
21 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
22 See, e.g., Amy Harmon, New Economy: With Music Widely Available Online, Is It
Now Time To Tighten Copyright Laws Or Consider Rewriting Them To Reflect Reality9,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at C4 (asking whether copyright law envisioned modern ease of
copying on mass scale made possible by Internet and whether laws should be modified);
Randall E. Stross, Chill, Hollywood, Chill: Let The People Watch What They Want When
They Want To, U.S. NEWS, Oct. 2, 2000, at 46 (warning that as digital media becomes
more prominent, loss of noncommercial "fair use" becomes more manifest); Patrick Ross,
2002]
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Finally, Part IV proposes a solution, a prediction really, that soon
enough the law will have to change in order to accommodate the
distribution of digitally stored copyrighted works on and over the
Internet, given the landmark Supreme Court case that did the
same for home video recording, Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc. 23
THE ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS OF THE 1998 DIGITIAL
MILLENIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides
that "[nlo person shall circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this
title.. ."24 Moreover, the statute includes a ban on trafficking in
these types of measures. 25  The provisions are intended to
prevent someone from gaining unauthorized access to a digitally
stored work protected under the copyright laws of Title 17.26
Boucher Attempts MOCA Hearings but Markup Is Seen Unlikely, WASHINGTON
INTERNETDAILY, Jan. 8, 2002 (outlining Virginia Congressman's attempt to amend DMCA
which collides with "fair use" law).
23 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding "time shifting" of televised programs for later viewing
was not infringing activity).
24 17 U.S.C. 1201 (a)(1)(A). This subsection also states that this prohibition takes
effect at the end of a two-year period from October 28, 1998. Id.
25 17 U.S.C. 1201(b) lists "[aldditional violations" as:
(1)No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that -
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing
protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of
a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof,
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other to
circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion
thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person
with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under
this title in a work or a portion thereof.
(2)As used in this subsection -
(A) to 'circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure' means
avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise impairing a
technological measure; and
(B) a technological measure 'effectively protects a right of a copyright owner
under this title' if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, prevents,
restricts, or otherwise limits the exercise of a right of a copyright owner under
this title.
26 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17-18 (1998); Paul Sweeting, Legal Tender,
VIDEO BUSINESS, Jan. 7, 2002, at 12 (stating "law permits copyright owners to use
encryption to bar redistribution of work by thirds parties"); Order Barring Posting and
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Although extremely effective against outright theft of
copyrighted material, the problem is that if a work is digitally
stored, the only way one can gain any access to it whatsoever is
by means of a "technological measure" that would circumvent the
protection barring access!2 7 Thus, if a college film professor
desired to take even a still frame of a digitally recorded movie, or
a student wished to quote a line from a digitally stored novel,
both professor and student would have to effectively violate this
statute in order to make a fair use of the work on their own.28
The provisions, in their haste to stamp out the rampant theft of
copyrighted material accessible on the Internet, are thus
somewhat overbroad because they impinge upon the "right" of an
alleged infringer to argue the defense of fair use for a work stored
in any type of digital medium. 29
The legislative intent in drafting these provisions seems to fall
on two sides. On one side is the "property-maximizing," "pay-per-
use" view of the House Judiciary Committee, which argued for
absolute liability against those who lack authorized access,
though recognizing that fair use is permissible when access is
Linking of DVD Decryption Did Not Violate Free Speech, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
J. (BNA), Dec. 7, 2001, at 108 (stating court found DeCSS akin to "property owners
prohibiting access with locks, safes, and security devices").
27 Nimmer argues that the reason why there is no prohibition on conduct in § 1201, as
opposed to a prohibition on circumvention conduct is that prior to the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, the conduct of circumvention was never before made unlawful. See
NIMMER, supra note 9, at 691. For a discussion on other statutory exemptions in § 1201
besides the defense of fair use, NIMMER, supra note 9, at 692-702 is a good source. See
generally David Nimmer, Back From the Future: A Proleptic Review of Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 16 BERKELY TECH. L. J. 855, 864 (2001); Dana J. Parker,
Cease and DeCSS: DVD's Encryption Code Cracked, Nov. 4, 1999, available at
http://www.emediapro.net/news99/news111.html (last visited August 25, 2002).
28 See NIMMER, supra note 9, at 17 (stating circumventing technological protection
placed by copyright owner to control access is electronic equivalent of breaking into locked
room to obtain books); John Naughton, Now You can't Make a Copy. Is This a Record
THE OBSERVER, Jan. 13, 2002, (stating fair use allows quotations for education or
learning); see also Dave Wilson & Jon Healey, CDs That Block Copying May Herald a
Revolution, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2002, Al at 1 (asserting that under DeCSS, people cannot
loan used books).
29 See Symposium, And the Shirt Off Your Back: Universal City Studios, DeCSS, and
the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 371, 384
(2001) (claiming DMCA's fair use exemption is "illusory right"); Parker, supra note 27
(claiming DeCSS only intended to prevent "casual copying" and thereby prevent ordinary
person's fair use). But see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d 294,
337 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing defendants' overbreadth claim, concluding that "those
wishing to make lawful use of copyrighted movies by viewing or listening to them are not
hindered in doing so in any material way by the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA.");
Universal City Studios, 111 F.Supp.2d at 346 (opining that defendants "have raised a
legitimate concern about the possible impact on traditional fair use of access control
measures in the digital era.").
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authorized. 30 On the other side lies the "fair use" view of the
House Commerce Committee, which argued that digital
technology could eventually whittle away fair use to no use
whatsoever. 31 The compromise that resulted in the existing law
shows that the Commerce Committee acquiesced in concluding
that the digital environment poses a unique threat to the rights
of copyright owners, and as such necessitates protection against
devices that undermine copyright interests. 32
One stipulation contained in § 1201, ostensibly cognizant of the
problem of having fair use whittled away to no use at all, was
that the statute would not go into effect pending a ruling issued
by the Library of Congress, which oversees the Copyright
Office. 33 After the office held hearings for almost two years, it
30 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998); Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan
Document Serv., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (Martin, J., dissenting) (believing that
requiring defendant to pay permission fees or "pay-per-use" is inconsistent with primary
mission of Copyright Act); Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1393 (stating fair use
doctrine, which requires unlimited public access to published works in educational
settings, is one essential check on otherwise exclusive property rights given to copyright
holders); see also John R. Therien, Comment, Exorcising the Specter of a Pay-Per-Use
Society Toward Preserving Fair Use and the Public Domain in the Dig'tal Age, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 979, 983-84 (2001) (stating Congress is aware DMCA system
favored copyright owners over fair users).
31 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25 (1998) (asserting that Committee on
Commerce analyzed implications of this broad prohibition on traditional principle of fair
use); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25 (1998) (stating "[als more and more industries
migrate to electronic commerce, fair use becomes critical to promoting a robust electronic
marketplace...'); see also Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital
Economy Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 519 (1999) (explaining approach and concerns of House Commerce Committee);
Randall E. Stross, Chill, Hollywood, chil: Let the people watch what they want when they
want to, U.S. NEWS, October 2, 2000, at 46 (warning that as digital media becomes more
prominent, loss of noncommercial "fair use" is going to become more manifest). See
generally, Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment
Skein, 54 STANFORD L. REV. 1, 74-85 (2001) (discussing effects of DMCA).
32 See NIMMER, supra note 2, at 683-84; see also Samuelson, supra note 31. See
generally Lawrence Jordan and Richard Herman, Aces-Content Regulation: Copyright,
Rights of Publicity, And Other Doctrines; 78 MI BAR J. 1272, 1272-1274 (1999) (giving
general overview of approaches to digital technologies copyright law).
33 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1) (A) states that the anti-circumvention provision contained
in § 1201(a)(1)(A) "shall take effect at the end of the two-year period beginning on the
date of the enactment of this chapter [enacted Oct. 28, 1998]." Moreover, § 1201
(a)(1)(C) delineates the role of the Librarian of Congress in determining whether
persons who are users of copyrighted works may be adversely affected by §
1201(a)(1)(A), which states:
During the [two]-year period described in subparagraph (A), and during each
succeeding [three]-year period, the Librarian of Congress, upon the
recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, who shall consult with the
Assistant Secretary of Communications and Information of the Department of
Commerce and report and comment on his or her views in making such
recommendation, shall make the determination in a rulemaking proceeding for
purposes of subparagraph (B) of whether persons who are users of a copyrighted
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issued a ruling stating that the proponents of various kinds of
exemptions had not demonstrated evidence that there would be
"substantial harm" if an exemption was not granted. The
provisions of the DMCA "as is" then went into effect on October
28, 2000.34 In the interim, groups like the Association of
American Universities, the American Library Association and
the Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and
Information Administration had maintained that broad
exemptions were necessary to preserve the "fair use" rights of
individuals. 35 Media companies like Sony and Time Warner,
however, argued that the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions
were necessary to protect their digital material, like computer
games and movies, from widespread unauthorized use.36 Since it
seems that, at least for now, media conglomerates have won out,
it remains to be seen whether such conglomerates like Sony,
work are, or are likely to be in the succeeding [three]-year period, adversely
affected by the prohibition under subparagraph (A) in their ability to make
noninfringing uses under this title of a particular class of copyrighted works. In
conducting such rulemaking, the Librarian shall examine -
i) the availability for use of copyrighted works;
(ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and
educational purposes;
(iii) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological
measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research;
(iv) the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market for or
value of copyrighted works; and
(v) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.
17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)(A). See generally Samuelson, supra note 31.
34 When DMCA was enacted, it granted copyright holders greater control over the
way people use books, movies and music that are distributed in digital form, by making it
illegal to break the technological safeguards for such works. However the DMCA was
problematic for several constituencies - including universities, libraries and computer
programmers - that had argued that the law should preserve traditional rights to archive
and lend out copyrighted material. Amy Harmon, Copyright Office Backs Ban on Code-
Breaking Software, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2000, at C16. Additionally the Copyright Act
permits persons who are neither copyright holders nor licensees to disassemble
copyrighted computer programs in order to gain understanding of the unprotected
functional elements of the program as a fair use of copyrighted work. Sega Enterprises,
LTD. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). See Walker v. University
Books, 602 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1979); Walt Disney Productions v. Filmation
Associates, 628 F. Supp. 871, 875-76 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
35 See supra note 34; see also Joshua H. Foley, Enter the Library: Creating a Digital
Lending Eight, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 369, 383 (2001) (explaining lobbying efforts of
American Library Association and National Telecommunications and Information
Administration regarding fair use allowances).
36 See supra note 34; see also John R. Therien, Exorcising the Specter of a 'Pay-Per-
Use" Society: Toward Preserving Fair Use and the Pubic Domain in the Digital Age, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 979, 1011- 1016 (2001) (giving overview of media industries
arguments against fair use).
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though adversely affected by such widespread unauthorized use
today, will eventually have an economic interest behind them in
arguing exactly the reverse, namely that if a market can be found
for decryption technology and "home use" in the same manner in
which the VCR made its way into homes, the DMCA's anti-
circumvention provisions will actually prove to hamper such
companies' economic interests in the long-term digital future.3 7
FAIR USE AS A DEFENSE TO WHAT AMOUNTS TO OTHERWISE
UNAUTHORIZED COPYING
The Doctrine of Fair Use Pre-Codification in the 1976 Copyright
Act
The defense of fair use has existed as far back as the 1710
Statute of Anne, 38  where English courts held that "fair
abridgements" would not infringe upon an author's rights.39
Although not always known under its present appellation, the
doctrine nevertheless has been upheld by American courts at
least since the first federal copyright statute was enacted in
1790.40 In fact, in 1845 Justice Story recognized that "[elvery
37 See generally Nancy A. Bloom, Protecting Copyright Owners of Digital Music - No
More Free Access to Cyber Tunes, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 179 (1997); Stephen Fraser, The
Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and Its Impact on the
Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 1 (1998) (considering possible limitations on
copyright imposed by the First Amendment); I. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright)
in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217 (1996) (discussing nature of property rights in
cyberspace); Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 185 (1992); Jessica Litman, Copyright and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV
275 (1989); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L.
REV. 19 (1996); DanThu Thi Phan, Note, Will Fair Use Function on the Internet 98
COLUM. L. REV. 169 (1998) (evaluating fair use doctrine in light of technological
advances).
38 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19. See Donaldson v. Beckett, 98 Eng. Rep. 257,
262 (H.L. 1774) (overruling Milar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769) and holding
that modem exclusive copyrights had never existed as right at common law); see also
Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the
Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1156-71, 188-91 (1983).
39 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 U.S. 569 (1994); see alsoW. PATRY, THE
FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW, 6-17 (1985); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1990).
40 Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (according protection to authors or his assigns of
any "map, chart or book" for fourteen years upon recording title with clerk's office of
district court where author or proprietor resided; and publishing copy of said record in one
or more newspapers for four weeks; and depositing copy of work itself in office of
Secretary of State within six months after publication). See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577
(stating fair use doctrine "permits and requires courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute, when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is
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book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily
borrow, and use much which was well known and used before."41
So even in the age before the Internet, digitally stored
copyrighted works, and the photocopier, fair use in some sense
has been implicitly recognized as part of Congress' constitutional
duty "[to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts..."42
Early copyright statutes enacted by the newly independent
thirteen colonies had, in their various preambles, three major
reasons for the underlying rationale for copyright. 43  The
majority or "positive" approach was to promote learning and
encourage writing.44 The practical or "negative" approach was to
stop the theft of copyrighted works.45 The middle or third
approach treated the protection of intellectual property as a
natural right,46 in a similar fashion to the way in which civil law
designed to foster." (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)); ROBERT A.
GORMAN AND JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS, 5 (5 th Ed. 1999)
(asserting privilege of renewal of copyright for fourteen more years was granted to author
on condition of again entering title and publishing record as long as author survived first
term).
41 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4, 436). See Carey
v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K.B. 1803) (expressing need to balance protection of
copyrighted material with society's need to build upon each copyrighted work).
42 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (quoting Sony that limited grant is means to
achieve important public purpose intended to motivate creative activity of authors and
inventors with special rewards and allowing public access to products of their genius after
limited period of exclusive control expires). See generally Fenning, The Origin of the
Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109 (1929).
43 Francine Crawford, Pre-Constitutional Copyright Statutes, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y 11, 13, 16 (1975) (stating original 13 American Colonies took different approaches
on subject of who should be protected, what was included, and how suits should be
brought; but all colonies had unified wish to encourage scholarship and protect
intellectual property rights).
44 See Crawford, supra note 43, at 14 (stating Massachusetts was primarily concerned
with "the improvement of Knowledge, the progress of Civilization, the public Weal of the
Community, and the Advancement of Human Happiness, [which] greatly depend on the
efforts of learned and ingenious Persons in the various Arts and Sciences .. " (quoting
Acts and Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 143 (1782))); see also Doris Estelle
Long, First, "Let's Kill All The Intellectual Property Lawyers!". Musings on the Decline
and Fall of the Intellectual Property Empire, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 851, 854 (stating
that, historically, intellectual property laws in the United States have served to encourage
and protect human innovation and creativity).
45 See Crawford, supra note 43, at 15 (stating Pennsylvania, for example, used
straightforward approach in wording of its language, which protected authors and
publishers from financial damage from theft); see also Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright For
Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1212 (1998) (stating that courts more
often used author's rights over public good as justification for patent rights).
46 See Crawford, supra note 43, at 14 (stating New York considered copyright
protection as natural right, stating that ". . . it is agreeable to the principles of natural
equity and justice, that every author should be secured in receiving the price that may
arise from the sale of his or her works. . . ." (quoting 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
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countries view the right to intellectual property, and the
copyright statutes so enacted simply codified that right.47 Thus,
fair use has become a part of these reasons and has come to
promote the "positive" approach by permitting writers to build
successively upon one another's works, and to promote the
"negative" approach by stopping fair use from becoming unfair,
overt appropriation.48
274, 2nd Ed. (1798)); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Essay- Copyright and Intermediate Users'
Rights 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 67, 68 (1999) (stating that federal government and
states stressed copyright protection as natural right). But see Tom W. Bell, Escape from
Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works,
69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 767 (2001) (stating that states' invocation of natural rights in
copyright was mere rhetoric).
47 Compare Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976)
("Monty Python" case), where the court drew a distinction between American copyright
law and copyright law in civil law countries, stating:
This cause of action, which seeks redress for deformation of an artist's work,
finds its roots in the continental concept of droit moral, or moral right, which
may generally be summarized as including the right of the artist to have his
work attributed to him in the form in which he created it.
American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or
provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the
economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors. Nevertheless, the
economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that serves as the
foundation for American copyright law... cannot be reconciled with the inability
of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the
public on which the artists are financially dependent. Thus courts have long
granted relief for misrepresentation of an artist's work by relying on theories
outside the statutory law of copyright, such as contract law,. . . or the tort of
unfair competition..." (emphasis added) (citations omitted), with Lee v. A.R.T.
Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997), which explained that:
No European version of droit moral goes this far. Until recently it was accepted
wisdom that the United States did not enforce any claim of moral rights; even
bowdlerization of a work was permitted unless the modifications produced a new
work so different that it infringed the exclusive right under § 106(2) [i.e., the
right to prepare derivative works based upon the underlying copyrighted work].
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5123-33,
moves federal law in the direction of moral rights, but the cornerstone of the new
statute, 17 U.S.C. § 106A, does not assist [the plaintiff Lee]. Section
106A(a)(3)(A) gives an artist the right to 'prevent any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his
or her honor or reputation.'
with WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 639 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.
1982) which held that no displacement of programming was threatened by requiring
cable television systems to carry teletext to be viewed in conjunction with news
programs because the same channel would carry the teletext and news programs.
See generally Lee D. Neumann, The Berne Convention and Droit de Suite Legislation in
the United States: Domestic and International Consequences of Federal Incorporation of
State Law for Treaty Implementation, 16 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 157 (1992).
48 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)
(stating "[tihe rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the
store of knowledge a fair return for their labors.") (emphasis added); see also Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating that balance must be
struck between rewarding private work and promoting public availability to arts).
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Fair Use As Codified in the 1976 Copyight Act
The 1976 Copyright Act codified the defense of fair use in the
form of four factors to be employed by the courts in determining
exactly what is a "fair use."49 For example, in Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc.,50 the Supreme Court held that 2 Live Crew's
commercial parody of Roy Orbison's song "Oh, Pretty Woman"
could be found to be a fair use in spite of the parody's commercial
character and excessive borrowing of Orbison's song.S1 Parody as
a fair use is thus an example of permissible comment or criticism
49 The first factor includes the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes [i.e.,
commercial use cuts against a finding of fair use, although not dispositive. 17 U.S.C. §
107. Under this factor, a transformative use cuts in favor of a finding of fair use, although
that is also not dispositive. Sony Corp. ofAmezica v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The second factor
involves the nature of the copyrighted work (i.e., fair use of works with greater value to
the public, such as scientific journals). 17 U.S.C. § 107. This factor is more likely to be
upheld than fair use of works with a low public value, such as a screenplay and the scope
of fair use is undoubtedly wider when information conveyed relates to matters of high
public concern. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724
F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983). The third factor looks at the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, i.e., quality and quantity.
17 U.S.C. § 107. The fourth factor includes the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107. For this factor, the court must
consider whether the use will adversely affect the market for the plaintiffs copyrighted
work, or even for a potential market as exhibited in Castle Rock Entertaiment, Inc. v.
Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
50 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Lower Federal courts have not applied Campbellconsistently,
e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., LP v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997),
which denied parody defense to publisher of a book that used familiar lyrics of the "Cat in
the Hat" to describe O.J. Simpson murder trial. The court in Dr. Seuss Enters., held such
lyrics as "[a] plea went out to Rob Shapiro, Can you save the fallen hero? And Marcia
Clark, hooray, hooray, was called in with a justice play" and "[a] man this famous never
hires, lawyers like, Jacoby-Meyers. . When you're accused of a killing scheme, you need to
build a real Dream Team" as infringing.
51 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594 (holding that "[n]o such evidentiary presumption is
available to address either the first factor, the character and purpose of the use, or the
fourth, market harm, in determining whether a transformative use, such as parody, is a
fair one."). See Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998)
(noting that difference in purpose is not synonymous with transformation and that
Campbell holds that transformativeness is critical question under this factor); Storm
Impact v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 788 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (stating
that transformative works more often promote science and arts, whereas works which
only copy original are likely to be held to be infringements of copyrighted piece). Cf
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding "When Sonny Sniffs Glue"
parody of "When Sunny Gets Blue" is fair use); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National
Broadcasting Co., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 741, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), azfd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.
1980) (holding "I Love Sodom" television parody of defendant's "Saturday Night Live"
television program fair use of "I Love New York" theme song); Walt Disney Productions v.
Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting defense of fair use for defendants'
bawdy cartoon magazine that pictorially depicted characters originated by plaintiff, e.g.,
Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck, engaged in sexual situations and using drugs, court
stated that defendants took "more than was necessary" to recall the Disney characters).
2002]
706 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL CO'MENTARY
of a copyrighted work.5 2 The author's consent to a reasonable use
of his work has always been implied by the courts in order to
promote the constitutional requirement of promoting science and
the useful arts, since prohibiting fair use would hamper writers
from improving upon their peers' works.53 There seems to exist
no better example of a permissible form of fair use than parody,
in that the constitutional safeguards of free speech and freedom
of the press have traditionally allowed criticism of and comment
upon private as well as public figures and officials54 as protected
speech under the First Amendment.55
52 See e.g., Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?" Notes on Market Failure
and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305, 312 (1993) (defining true
parody as one that really criticizes or comments on original in some meaningful sense);
Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992) (defining
parody as take-off on another work or genre of works); Alfred C. Yen, When Authors
Won't Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79, 84
(1991) (stating that "[a] long string of cases commits the courts to the principle that
parodists are entitled to borrow more from an author's work than other users."); Geri J.
Yonover, Artistic Parody: The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 117 (1996) (noting that "[blecause parody relies on
recognition of the host work, it necessarily 'copies' at least enough of that work to conjure
it up for the viewing or listening public.").
53 H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944). Accord Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985) (stating that
reviewer may fairly cite largely from original work, if his design be really and truly to use
passages for purposes of fair and reasonable criticism, but it is clear that if he thus cites
most important parts of work, with view, not to criticize, but to supersede use of original
work, and substitute review for it, such use will be deemed piracy (quoting Justice Story
in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C. D. Ma. 1841) (No. 4,901)).
54 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (announcing "actual
malice" standard for libel involving public figures); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) (addressing speech on matters of private
concern); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-47 (1974) (holding private person
does not have to meet Timed "actual malice" standard). See generally Janice E. Oakes,
Copyright and the First Amendment: Where Lies the Public Interest?, 59 TUL. L. REV.
135, 140 (1984) (noting that in situations where access to ideas alone is not sufficient to
allow author to express his own ideas, and rights of free speech and free press demand
access to particular form of expression contained in copyrighted work, doctrine of fair use
provides means by which to balance exclusive rights of copyright owner against public's
interest in dissemination of information affecting areas of universal concern, such as art,
science, history, or industry); Lionel S. Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A
Gathering Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. ASCAP 43, 50-51 (1971) (stating that fair use
is exception to copyright grounded on public policy and based on Constitution itself in that
it promotes "Progress of Science and useful Arts").
55 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (formulating modern incitement
test whereby constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit states
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action thereby likely to
incite or produce such action); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (holding
that preaching on street, considered in light of constitutional guarantees, is protected
speech and is not inciting breach of peace); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas-best test of truth is power of thought to get itself accepted in
competition of market for truth is only ground upon which one's wishes can be safely
[Vol. 16:691
FAIR USE NO LONGER
If a work happens to be unpublished, as was President Gerald
Ford's "purloined" manuscript in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises,5 6 its unpublished nature will cut against a
finding of fair use, though alone such nature cannot be the sole
factor in a finding against fair use.57 Courts merely use its
unpublished nature along with the four factors in determining
whether the use is fair.58 For works transformative in nature,
such a characteristic will cut in favor of a finding of fair use,
although again it will not be dispositive.59
carried out). Cf Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (listing certain
well-defined, narrowly limited classes of speech, prevention and punishment of which
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem, including lewd and obscene,
profane, libelous, insulting or "fighting" words-those by which their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite immediate breach of peace, having no essential part of
expression of ideas and of negligible social value); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919) (invoking clear and present danger test to identify substantive evils that may be
present in speech and which Congress has right to prevent). See generally Paul
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970) (noting
that safeguard afforded by first amendment is central to maintenance of functions and
values of democratic society); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970)
(opining that marketplace of ideas would be utterly bereft, and democratic dialogue
largely stifled if only ideas which might be discussed were those original with speakers).
56 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549 (holding use of copyrighted manuscript, even
stripped to verbatim quotes conceded by defendant, The Nation, to be copyrightable
expression, was not fair use within meaning of Copyright Act).
57 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552 (stating Copyright Act eliminated publication of
material "as a dividing line between common law and statutory protection "); see also 3-
12A NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.04 (stating that exemptions from anti-circumvention
violations only apply to "commercially exploited copyrighted work," thus excluding
unpublished works from its scope); WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN
COPYRIGHT LAW, 542 (BNA Books 2d ed. 1995) (1985); Joseph R. Re, The Stage of
Publication as a 'Fair Use" Factor: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV 597, 613 (commenting that fact work is unpublished is critical
element of its "nature").
58 See Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 n.8 (11th Cir. 1984)
(holding that fair use is best described as mixed question of law and fact); 4-13 NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (noting that courts use four factors to be considered for purpose of
determining whether use is fair use, however, no steadfast rule may automatically be
applied in deciding whether any particular use is "fair"); see also ROBERT A. GORMAN &
JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES: CASES AND MATERIALS, 579-81 (The
Michie Company 4th ed. 1993) (1981) (commenting on several post-Harer & Row
decisions and pointing out that decisions followed Supreme Court's indication that
unlicensed disclosure of expression of unpublished work would rarely be held fair); New
Era Publs. Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 577 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that
extensive reproduction of published and unpublished writings of L. Ron Hubbard,
founder of Church of Scientology, amount to infringement of copyrights and that use of
unpublished material cannot be held to pass fair use test); Salinger v. Random House,
Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that Salinger has right to protect expressive
content of his unpublished writings for term of his copyright, and that right prevails over
claim of fair use under "ordinary circumstances"). Cf 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001) (adding in
1992 that fact that work is unpublished shouldn't bar fair use finding if such finding is
upon consideration of all factors.").
59 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at 569 (stating that
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Fair Use and Its Application To Mass Copying Made Possible By
New Technologies
Two cases that predate the explosion of digital technology and
the now ballooning problem of exploitation of digitally stored
copyrighted works are Pr'nceton University Press v. Michigan
Document Services, Inc.,60 and American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, Inc..61  Both cases, nevertheless, are particularly
applicable to the problem because they involve the critical fourth
factor, which measures "the effect of the [alleged infringer's] use
upon the potential market for or value of the [plaintiffs]
copyrighted work," a market or value that could be detrimentally
affected by too much borrowing or a more than fair taking of the
underlying work.62 Whole takings of copyrighted phonorecords
(CDs) and DVD movies over the Internet are what have
prompted legal actions by some of the largest American and
overseas corporations, 63  remarkably reminiscent of when
transformative use, such as parody, cuts in favor of fair use, but is not dispositive,
because only one factor to be considered). Cf Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding "When Sonny Sniffs Glue" parody of "When Sunny Gets Blue" is fair use);
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd,
623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding "I Love Sodom" television parody of defendant's
"Saturday Night Live" television program fair use of "I Love New York" theme song); Walt
Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting defense of fair
use for defendants' bawdy cartoon magazine that pictorially depicted characters
originated by plaintiff engaged in sexual situations and using drugs, because court stated
that defendants took "more than was necessary to recall" Disney characters).
60 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997).
61 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995).
62 See 17 U.S.C. §107(4) (2001); see also Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol
Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that main concern in
considering fourth factor of 17 U.S.C. §107 is whether secondary use "usurps or
substitutes" marketing for original work); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publishing
Group, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), affd, 181 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1999)
(opining that "function of the fourth element of the fair use inquiry is to determine
whether the copyright holder will be harmed because the infringing book acts as a market
substitute for either the original or a derivative work"); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v.
Publications Intl, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1378 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that book about Twin
Peaks television series that discusses show's popularity, characters, actors, plots, creator,
music, and poses trivia questions about show is not fair use); Salinger v. Random House,
811 F. 2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987) (positing that "the need to assess the effect on the market
for Salinger's letters is not lessened by the fact that their author has disavowed any
intention to publish them during his lifetime."); Benjamin E. Marks, Copyright
Protection, Privacy Rights, and the Fair Use Doctrine. The Post-Salinger Decade
Reconsidered, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1376, 1399-1400 (1997) (discussing court's recognition of
privacy-based exception).
63 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (stressing that fair use defense does not apply to "technology designed to
circumvent technological measures that control access to copyrighted works"); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying
defendant's fair use defense to its facilitation of compact disc recordings over Internetas
FAIR USE NO LONGER
Universal Studios first sued Sony as a contributory infringer for
making the videocassette recorder,64 because Universal feared
the market for its movies would dry up if people could record for
free. Now, as we can see with the growth of Blockbuster video
stores and the home viewing market, 65 Universal and others in
its stead are ostensibly more than happy that Sony opened up a
new market. It is submitted that the Internet will do the same,
provided fair use of digitally stored works is not permitted to be
whittled away, but instead is protected by the very forces that
oppose it today; it will be an economic necessity for many of the
major corporations involved in digital media. Hence, as soon as
these large corporations can figure out how to embrace the new
technology of the Internet and allow decryption of digitally stored
books and movies in a manner that will not amount to mass
misappropriation, they will most likely lobby for a change in §
1201 of the DMCA, precisely because it will then be in their best
interests - in at least a few years down the road.66
"indefensible and must be denied as a matter of law"); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F.
Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (finding fair use doctrine applied to defendant's use
of "thumbnail" images as part of its Internetsearch engine). See generally Nancy A.
Bloom, Protecting Copyright Owners of Digital Music - No More Free Access to Cyber
Tunes, 45 J.C.P.S. 179, 183-85 (1997) (discussing growth of websites that allow people to
download music cheaply and easily).
64 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984)
(holding that Sony's sale of videocassette recorders does not constitute copyright
infringement); see also Jonathon Bank & Andrew J. McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A
Peek Behind the Scenes at the Making of Sony v. Universal City Studios, 17 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 427, 428-29 (1994) (stating that district court in Sony focused on fact that
videotaping was for private home use and not for commercial use); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure.- A Structural Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1656 (1982) (noting that courts should weigh benefits to society
against harm to plaintiff in order to examine fair use). See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX, 149-57 (1994) (discussing history of copyright law).
65 See e.g, Amy Harmon, AOL to Distribute Software to Secure Music Copyrights,
N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 2000, at C2 (quoting Talal Shamoon, senior vice president for Media
at Intertrust as saying "music companies could harness AOL's subscribers to drive sales
by offering incentives" if secure distribution devices are used); Amy Harmon, New
Economy: With Music Widely Available Online, Is It Now Time To 7ghten Copyright
Laws Or Consider Rewriting Them To Reflect Reality?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at C4
(questioning whether existing copyright law did envisioned mass scale copying available
through Internet and what implications of that are). See generally Amy Harmon, US.
Verus Microsoft: The Consumers; Some Soiware Users Wary of Judge's Findings, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1999, at A22 (discussing effect of Internet on market).
66 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991)
(holding facts are not copyrightable); see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 726 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating copyright laws are not restrictions
on freedom of speech as copyright protects only form of expression and not ideas
expressed); Copyright Extension Stifles Creativity, Lawyer Tells Court- N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
6, 2000, at C3 (stating law supported by Disney and other big companies is being
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In Princeton, the defendant was a commercial copyshop that
reproduced substantial parts of copyrighted textbooks and
treatises, etc., and bound them into "coursepacks" to sell to
students at the University of Michigan.67 The defendant never
obtained permission from the copyright holders to reproduce the
works it copied. The court upheld the district court's holding
that the exploitation of the copyrighted works was not a fair
use.68 In making its determination, the court treated the fourth
factor as primus inter pares, and concluded that the alleged
infringer failed to satisfy his burden of proof, which rested on
him since the use was commercial in nature.69  The court
considered that under Harper & Row, 70 "[t]o negate fair use, one
need only show that if the challenged use 'should become
widespread, it would adversely effect the potential market for the
copyrighted work."'71 On this ground the court found that the
appealed on ground that by extending copyrights to works like Disney's cartoon
characters, "guarantees of free speech" are violated "by reprivatizing works that otherwise
would have become private property").
67 Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir., 1996).
68 Princeton University Press, 99 F.3d at 1391(affirming district court's finding that it
was not fair use for the copyshop to copy over 30% of copyrighted works); see also
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994), (stating "fair use doctrine
permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster" (quoting Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522, 1536 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding Kinko's copyshop violated copyright statute by
creating and selling coursepacks without permission from publishing houses that held
copyrights to copied works).
69 See Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc. 99 F. 3d 1381,
1381 (61h Cir. 1996) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 417, 451 (1984) that burden of proof as to
market effect rests with the copyright holder if the challenged use is if a 'noncommercial'
nature and that alleged infringer has burden if challenged use is 'commercial' in nature,
but finding that strength of Sony presumption may vary according to context and
presumption disappears entirely when challenged use is one that transforms original
work into new artistic creation; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
590-91 (1994) (stating that there is presumption of market harm where use is commercial
in nature).
70 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985)
(holding that unauthorized publications excerpts of copyrighted material was not fair use
when it substantially affects market for such work); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating immediate effect of copyright law is securing fair
return for author's creative labor); supra notes 1 & 34; see also Princeton University Press
v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F. 3d 1381, 1387 (61h Cir. 1996) (quoting Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539,569 (1985) to show that
plaintiffs copying is not fair use).
71 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451). See generally
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair- A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1137 (1990) (discussing Sony and Harper & Row decisions); Leo Raskind, A Functional
Interpretation of Fair Use, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 601 (1984); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use
and How It Got That Way, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 634 (1998).
FAIR USE NO LONGER
defendant's copying of copyrighted material to sell in coursepacks
to students did not amount to a fair use. 72
The holding in Princeton could be applied to the new
technology of digital media, for it seems likely that a court would
hold that if what the defendant did with a photocopier he had
done with digitally stored works, that too would not be a fair use.
Yet what if a professor simply wanted to photocopy a few articles
from works of scholarship for use in an educational setting and
not for commercial profit?73 If the works were digitally stored,
the professor could not make a fair use of them at all without
violating § 1201; instead, the professor would have to pay for use
of each and every article. The dissent in Princeton argued
against such a result, believing that requiring the defendant to
pay permission fees ("pay-per-use") is inconsistent with the
primary mission of the Copyright Act. 74 The majority agreed
3therwise, explaining that even if the copying had been
performed by a "nonprofit educational" institution, or by the
students themselves, and had constituted fair use, "it would not
be possible for a non-profit institution, by means of contractual
arrangements with a commercial copying enterprise, to authorize
the enterprise to carry out copying and distribution functions
that would be exempt if conducted by the non-profit institution
itself."75 The conflict here between the majority and the dissent
72 See Princeton Univer. Press v. Mich. Document Serv., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
73 See Addison-Wesley Publishing v. New York University, 1983 WL 1134 (asserting
university and professors were sued for copyright infringement for using photocopies of
copyrighted works in their classes); see also Eric D. Brandfonbrener, Fair Use And
University Photocopying: Addison-Wesley Pubhshing v. New York University, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 669, 669-673 (discussing importance of settlement in Addison -Wesley
Publishing); Cf Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156
(W.D.N.Y. 1982) (explaining case where high school English teacher copied copyrighted
motion picture of Hamlet shown on television on his home videotape machine and
exhibited it to his students during class).
74 See Princeton University Press, 99 F.3d at 1389 ( J. Martin, dissenting) (stating
"fair use doctrine, which requires unlimited public access to published works in
educational settings, is one of the essential checks on the otherwise exclusive property
rights given to copyright holders under the Copyright Act"); see also Gilbert Busby, Fair
Use and Educational Copymg. A Reexamination of Princeton University Press v.
Michigan Document Service, Inc., 86 KY. L.J. 675, 676 (1997) (noting Chief Judge
Martin's dissent), Michael F. Frey, Casenote, Unfairly Applying The Fair Use Doctrine.
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 66 U. CINN. L. REV. 959, 990-
992 (1998) (discussing dissent rationale).
75 Princeton University Press, 99 F.3d at 1389 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. at 74 (1976), U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5687-88). See W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE
PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW, 420n.34 (1985) (noting courts rejection of attempts of for-
profit users from "standing in shoes of their customers making nonprofit uses"); Pierre N.
Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1122 (1990) (discussing
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exhibits the problem posed by the development of faster means of
copying permitted by the photocopier; the scale upon which
copying on the Internet with digital technology is permitted is
millions of times greater.7 6  Granted that in Princeton a
commercial copyshop should be required to at least get
authorization from the copyright holders to make its
coursepacks, yet what if students and professors had been the
ones making the coursepacks for themselves to obviate the need
to purchase textbooks? Surely they possess a stronger argument
for fair use in line with the true purpose of the copyright laws,
though the adverse impact on copyright holders, in the form of
zero or reduced compensation for their works, must be mitigated
as well.77
effect of copyrighting large volumes of material on application of fair use doctrine); Jessica
Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 857
(1987) (discussing 1976 Copyright Act).
76 GORMAN & GINSBERG, supra note 58, at 674 states that with the application of the
fair use doctrine to new technologies:
The advent and wide availability of the photocopy machine, and more recently, of
personal computers, have posed important challenges to the enforcement of
copyright law. They have also compelled reconsideration of the role of the fair
use doctrine in shielding personal and educational copying ... [T]he ever-
expanding availability and storage capacity of digital media and copying devices
promise to supplant the photocopier as the major means of private and
institutional copying.
Historically, the development of faster, more effective means of copying has
obliged the copyright system to respond to the new technology. The photocopier
affords one illustration. Copying by hand was sufficiently arduous to carry its
own limitations as to both length of copied passages and the number of copies.
The same was true of copying by typewriter and even by early forms of
duplicating machines, such as the mimeograph (where the prototype had to be
generated by typewriting and could only be used a limited number of times).
Wide use of the photocopy machine brought the capacity to generate copies
unlimited in length and number. Copymaking became so widely dispersed
throughout businesses, schools, libraries and even homes as to be largely beyond
the reach of practicable monitoring. Of course, much of what was photocopied
would have been unprotectible by copyright, such as eighteenth century poetry
and federal court opinions. Just as obviously, much of what has been copied is
material that is protected by the law of copyright.
See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 185 (1992); Jessica Litman, Copyright and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV
275 (1989) (discussing revisions in copyright law); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright
Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19 (1996) (discussing copyright law and new
technology).
77
[Student and professor's] access to books, and their commitment to
dissemination of knowledge, induce schools and libraries to use photocopying
in aid of what they view as their fundamental and valuable social purposes.
Th[is] nonprofit status (for the most part) contributes to the plausibility of
their reliance on the fair use defense. On the other hand, the volume of
photocopying done by such institutions (particularly colleges and universities),
the large potential adverse impact upon copyright owners, and the visibility
FAIR USE NO LONGER
In American Geophysical, defendant Texaco was charged with
unauthorized copying because its 400 to 500 research scientists
regularly and systematically photocopied scientific journals in
their day-to-day work.78 Although the work of the scientists
themselves is considered noncommercial and in the public
interest, which would cut in favor of fair use, the court reasoned
that Texaco itself was directly benefiting from the work of the
scientists as employees, and hence the copying was deemed
commercial in nature and therefore cut against a finding of fair
use.79 The court concluded that Texaco would have to either
subscribe to more copies of scientific research journals, or have
its scientists share copies, but what it was doing was definitely
not a fair use.80
To analogize, if what Texaco was doing with photocopiers it
had instead performed with its computers over the Internet, it
most likely would not have been held by a court to be a fair use.8 1
The fact of the matter is that § 1201 is designed to prevent
exactly what Texaco did with photocopiers from someone doing
the same over the Internet on an even more massive scale. This
danger of exponentially increased unauthorized copying on the
Internet is precisely the present-day problem that Congress has
and amenability to monitoring of many of these institutions, all contribute to a
reasonable desire to curb photocopying excesses, at least where they are
uncompensated.
GORMAN & GINSBERG, supra note 58, at 674.
78 See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1005 (1995).
79 See American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 921-923 (discussing whether use by
scientists was commercial or noncommercial).
80 See American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 931; see also Jonathan Evan Goldberg, Now
That The Future Has Arrived, Maybe The Law Should Take A Look: Multimedia
Technology And Its Interaction With The Fair Use Doctrine, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 919, 950
(1995) (explaining that corporation's dispersion of "free" copies resulted in plaintiffs loss
of revenue and was determinative against finding fair use privilege); Steven D. Smit,
Esq., "Make A Copy For The File.. .": Copyright Infringement by Attorneys, 46 BAYLOR
L. REV. 1, n.184 (1994) (noting court's decision that because licensing program could yield
authorized copies at reasonable price, copying done by defendants was not fair use).
81 See generally Stephen Fraser, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and
Copyright Law and Its Impact on the Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 1, 42
(1998) (noting that several courts have held that making of temporary copy through
online browsing may infringe copyright); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and
Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 10 (1987) (highlighting that by extending traditional
copyright to new technology doctrinal issues emerged); DanThu Thi Phan, Will Fair Use
Function on the Internet 98 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 186-206 (1998) (exploring unique
characteristics of Internet upon copyright scheme and fair use doctrine and some
proposals on how to manage new medium).
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tried to eliminate in the short term.82 Let us turn now to how
Congress' answer has not only provided an airtight solution to
this problem on the Internet, but also effectively fettered its own
mandate to promote the progress of science and the useful arts
by blocking any type of fair use of works stored in digital media.83
THE UNAVAILABILITY OF FAIR USE AS A DEFENSE TO ACCESSING
AND COPYING DIGITALLY STORED COPYRIGHTED WORKS
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerde, 84 eight major
United States motion picture studios sought an injunction
against a number of computer hackers from posting decryption
technology on their Internet website. 85 The studios sell Digital
Versatile Disks (DVDs)86 containing digitally stored motion
pictures, which are protected by an encryption system called
CSS.87 The studios generally first release the movies in theatres
82 See generally Yochai Benkler, Free As The Air To Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints On Enclosure Of The Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 423 (1999)
(noting copyright industries' arguments to Congress that additional copyright protections
were needed because contemporary technology makes production and dissemination of
unauthorized copies too easy); June Chung, The Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act and Its Failure to Address the Issue of Digital Music's New Form of
Distribution, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 1361, 1388 (1997) (proporting Georgetown University's
Cyberspace Law Institute's suggestion for court system for Internet or similar cyber
monitors); William A. Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1661, 1725-1726 (1988) (highlighting that Congress has in few contexts instituted
compulsory licensing systems which should continue to be utilized and to greater extent).
83 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cI. 8. See generally David Nimmer, A Riffon Fair Use in
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 741 (2000) (noting that
consumers have been traditionally protected by fair use doctrine, but future may bring
need for pay-per-use systems or de facto perpetual protection); Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations
Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 519, 538 (1999) (expounding that Congress
may need to recognize broader range of circumvention exceptions in future to allow for
legitimate uses of copyrighted material).
84 111 F.Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
85 See generally Hillary Rosner, Hollywood vs. The Hacker, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 23, 2000,
at 55 (recounting story of defendant and suit against him, including his plans to take case
to Supreme Court, if necessary); Harmon, supra note 7, at C1 (explaining judge's ruling
that MP3.com had willfully infringed copyrights when it allowed users to listen to music
from connected computer after indicating they possessed CD); Stross, supra note 7, at 46
(discussing story of journalist who was sued for publishing descrambling code).
86 DVDs are five-inch wide disks capable of storing more than 4.7 gigabytes of data,
and can be used to hold full-length motion pictures in digital form. See Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d at 307; see also Michael Spink, Authors Stripped of Their Electronic Rights in
Tasini v. New York Times Co., 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 416 (1999); Eric W. Young,
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes: Promoting the Progress of Science and the
Useful Arts by Demoting the Progress of Science and the Useful ArtsZ 28 N. KY. L. REV.
847, 848 (2001).
87 The Court defined CSS as:
"... Content Scramble System,.. . an access control and copy prevention system
[Vol. 16:691
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nationwide, and subsequently release them in DVD format for
"home video" exhibition. 88 The decryption technology posted on
defendants' website, called DeCSS, enabled the decryption of a
movie protected by CSS.89 Since the DVDs were encrypted, they
could only be viewed on a DVD player or drive containing CSS,
which is a decryption key enabling one to access the DVD's
content and thereby play the movie on a home DVD player.
The defendants argued, inter alia,90 that their use was non-
for DVDs developed by the motion picture companies, including plaintiffs. It is
an encryption based system that requires the use of appropriately configured
hardware such as a DVD player or a computer DVD drive to decrypt, unscramble
and play back, but not copy, motion pictures on DVDs. The technology necessary
to configure DVD players and drives to play CSS-protected DVDs has been
licensed to hundreds of manufacturers in the United States and around the
world."
Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d at 308(emphasis in original). See Eddan Elizafon Katz,
RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc. & Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 59-60 (2001); Cameron Pope, Missing Link(s): Protecting Public
Image and Corporate Profits in Cyberspace, 38 HOus. L. REV. 651, 671 (2001).
88 On the development of DVD and CSS, the court summarized:
Motion pictures first were, and still are, distributed to the home market in the
form of video cassette tapes. In the early 1990's, however, the major movie
studios began to explore distribution to the home market in digital format, which
offered substantially higher audio and visual quality and greater longevity than
videocassette tapes. This technology, which in 1995 became what is known today
as DVD, brought with it a new problem - increased risk of piracy by virtue of the
fact that digital files, unlike the material on video cassettes, can be copied with
degradation from generation to generation. In consequence, the movie studios
became concerned as the product neared market with the threat of DVD piracy.
Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d at 309; see also supra, note 14; Katz, supra note 86, at 59.
89 The Court provided some background on how DeCSS was born:
In late September 1999, Jon Johansen, a Norwegian subject then fifteen years
of age, and two individuals he 'met' under pseudonyms over the Internet,
reverse engineered a licensed DVD player and discovered the CSS encryption
algorithm and keys. They used this information to create DeCSS, a program
capable of decrypting or 'ripping' encrypted DVDs, thereby allowing playback
on non-compliant computers as well as the copying of decrypted files to
computer hard drives. Mr. Johansen then posted the executable code on his
personal Internetwebsite and informed members of an Internetmailing list
that he had done so. Neither Mr. Johansen nor his collaborators obtained a
license from the DVD [Copy Control Association].
Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d at 311.
90 The defendants also claimed that their posting of DeCSS on their Internet website
was solely to achieve interoperability with the Linux software operating system, so that
they could play DVDs on such a system. .Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d at 320. This claim is a
claim of reverse engineering, which, if the court had concluded what really was the
defendants' true purpose in decrypting CSS, would have provided a valid exemption for
the defendants under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(0 of the DMCA. Cf Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that 1976 Copyright Act
permitted defendants, who were neither copyright holders nor licensees, to disassemble,
i.e., reverse engineer, copyrighted computer program in order to gain understanding of
unprotected functional elements of program); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo ofAmerica,
975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Computer Associates Intl, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693
(2d Cir. 1992).
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infringing, because decryption technology like DeCSS is
necessary in order to make a fair use of the digitally encrypted
works. 91 The Court held to the contrary, however, stating that
CSS effectively controls access to the plaintiffs copyrighted
works, and that the defendant's statutory fair use argument was
entirely without merit.92  The Court reiterated that the
defendants were not being sued for copyright infringement, for
which an argument of fair use would be appropriate.93 Instead,
the defendants were being sued for violating §1201(a)(2) of the
DMCA for providing "technology primarily designed to
circumvent technological measures that control access to
copyrighted works.. ."94 The Court concluded that the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act clearly covered defendants' violation of
the anti-circumvention provisions stated therein. 95
91 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
92 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 321, 324.
93 Judge Lewis A. Kaplan interestingly, yet cautiously, pointed out that:
[slociety increasingly depends upon technological means of controlling access to
digital files and systems, whether they are military computers, bank [or] ...
academic records, copyrighted works or something else entirely. There are far
too many who, given any opportunity, will bypass those security measures, some
for the sheer joy of doing it, some for innocuous reasons, and others for more
malevolent purposes. Given the virtually instantaneous and worldwide
dissemination widely available via the Internet, the only rational assumption is
that once a computer program capable of bypassing such an access control system
is disseminated, it will be used...
There was a time when copyright infringement could be dealt with quite
adequately by focusing on the infringing act. If someone wished to make and sell
high quality but unauthorized copies of a copyrighted book, for example, the
infringer needed a printing press. The copyright holder, once aware of the
appearance of infringing copies, usually was able to trace the copies up the chain
of distribution, find and prosecute the infringer, and shut off the infringement at
the source.
In principle, the digital world is very different. Once a decryption program like
DeCSS is written, it quickly can be sent all over the world. Every recipient is
capable not only of decrypting and perfectly copying plaintiffs copyrighted DVDs,
but also of retransmitting perfect copies of DeCSS and thus enabling every
recipient to do the same. They likewise are capable of transmitting perfect copies
of the decrypted DVD. The process potentially is exponential rather than linear.
Indeed, the difference is illustrated by comparison of two epidemiological models
describing the spread of different kinds of disease.
Reimerdes 111 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
94 Seeid. at331.
95 The Reimnerdes court continued "[ilf Congress had meant the fair use defense to
apply to such actions, it would have said so. Indeed, as the legislative history
demonstrates, the decision not to make fair use a defense to a claim under Section 1201(a)
was quite deliberate." Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d at 322. See Amy Harmon, Copyright
Office Backs Ban on Code-Breaking Software, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2000, at C16 (noting
when judge issued ruling, law did not prohibit actual use of such device by individuals
and was pending review by copyright office because Congress had asked copyright office
to determine whether any exemptions were necessary to ensure that rights of the users of
FAIR USE NO LONGER
The defendants further argued that the DMCA was
unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment because
it blocks the distribution of DeCSS, a computer program that
constitutes free speech. 96  Assuming, arguendo, that the
executable code of DeCSS was indeed expression, the Court
reasoned that such code was more functional than expressive,
and that the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA was a "valid
exercise of Congress' authority."97 In fact, the Court made a
strong argument that the DMCA was more in furtherance of the
goals of copyright law than not, by stressing the DMCA's
functionality and not its suppression. 98
Yet in holding that there was no impingement on the First
Amendment rights of the defendants, the Reimerdes court relied
in part on Junger v. Daley,99 which held that encryption software
in the form of source code is merely functional and not
expressive, protected speech. This decision was reversed,
copyrighted works were balanced with those of copyright holders).
96 Compare Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendmen 15
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 713, 714 (2000) (criticizing Tien's position that First Amendment
covers all speech acts), with Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 626, 694-701 (2000) (stating the First Amendment presumptively covers all
speech acts).
97 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 332. The court qualified its holding on this
issue, however, stating that:
... it is important to emphasize that this is a very narrow holding. The
restriction the Court here upholds, notwithstanding that computer code is within
the area of First Amendment concern, is limited (1) to programs that circumvent
access controls to copyrighted works in digital form in circumstances in which (2)
there is no other practical means of preventing infringement through use of the
programs, and (3) the regulation is motivated by a desire to prevent performance
of the function for which the programs exist rather than any message they might
convey. One readily might imagine other circumstances in which a governmental
attempt to regulate the dissemination of computer code would not similarly be
justified.
Id.98 Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d at 329. As another court has noted, the DMCA was
enacted "both to preserve copyright enforcement on the Internet and to provide immunity
to service providers from copyright infringement liability for "passive" and "automatic"
actions in which a service provider's system engages through a technological process
initiated by another without the knowledge of the service provider." For the proposition
that the DMCA was enacted to strike a balance between the protection afforded a
copyright owner and society's access to information, see Eddan Elizafon Katz,
Reanetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc. & Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 53 (2001).
99 8 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998), rev'd, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000). The Junger
court found that while exporting encryption source code may occasionally possess
expressive elements, First Amendment protection does not necessarily attach to it. Id. at
716-717. The court in Reimerdes found that even assuming that DeCSS possessed
expressive content, such content was minimal when compared to its essentially functional
component. See Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp. 2d 335.
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however, four months after the decision in Reimerdes.00
Although it is conceded here that had Junger been available to
the Reimerdes court, Reimerdes would likely have had the same
result, it goes to the weight of the argument that fair use as
applied to digital media is in significant danger of wasting
away.101 What is important about Reimerdes- the first case to
be brought under the DMCA102 - is that the court recognized how
100 SeeJunger v. Daly, 209 F.3d 481 (2000). The Jungercourt, citing Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995), explained that:
The issue of whether or not the First Amendment protects encryption source code
is a difficult one because source code has both an expressive feature and a
functional feature. The United States does not dispute that it is possible to use
encryption source code to represent and convey information and ideas about
cryptography and that encryption source code can be used by programmers and
scholars for such informational purposes. Much like a mathematical or scientific
formula, one can describe the function and design of encryption software by a
prose explanation; however, for individuals fluent in a computer programming
language, source code is the most efficient and precise means by which to
communicate ideas about cryptography.
The district court concluded that the functional characteristics of source code
overshadow its simultaneously expressive nature. The fact that a medium of
expression has a functional capacity should not preclude constitutional
protection. Rather, the appropriate consideration of the medium's functional
capacity is in the analysis of permitted government regulation.
The Supreme court has explained that "all ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance," including those concerning "the advancement of
truth, science, morality, and arts" have the full protection of the First
Amendment... This protection is not reserved for purely expressive
communication.
The Supreme Court has expressed the versatile scope of the First Amendment by
labeling as "unquestionably shielded" the artwork of Jackson Pollock, the music
of Arnold Schoenberg, or the Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll, [citing HurleA.
Though unquestionably expressive, these things identified by the Court are not
traditional speech. Particularly, a musical score cannot be read by the majority of
the public but can be used as a means of communication among musicians.
Likewise, computer source code, though unintelligible to many, is the preferred
method of communication among computer programmers.
Because computer source code is an expressive means for the exchange of
information and ideas about computer programming, we hold that it is protected
by the First Amendment.
Junger, 209 F.3d at 481-485. The Junger court was not alone in holding that computer
source code can merit First Amendment protection. The court in Bernstein v. United
States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1434-1436 (N.D. Cal. 1996) found that
computer source code qualifies as speech for First Amendment purposes).
101 Junger, 209 F.3d at 481-485. The exemptions provided for in the DMCA have
been criticized for falling short of "conventional understandings of fair use." Robert C.
Denicola, Mostly Dead? Copyright Law in the New Millenium, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'v
USA 193, 203 (2000). The DMCA has also been criticized for failing to protect the fair use
rights of contents users. David Nimmer, A Rift on Fair Use in the Digital Millenium
Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000). For the argument that the DMCA as
enacted does not provide adequate safeguards to protect the fair use of digital media, see
John R. Therien, Exorcising the Specter of a "Pay-Per-Use" Society: Toward Preserving
Fair Use and the Public Domain in the Digital Age, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979 (2001).
102 See Hillary Rosner, Hollywood vs. The Hacker, N.Y. MAG. Oct. 23, 2000, at 56
(quoting defendant's lawyer as stating that this was first case brought under Digital
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"technological means of controlling access to works creates a risk,
depending on future technological and commercial developments,
of limiting access to works that are not protected by copyright[,]
such as works upon which copyright has expired." 03 Although
the defense of fair use raised by the defendants in this case was
inappropriate,104  this concession nevertheless reflects the
potential problem with the DMCA's bar of the use of
technological means to decrypt an encrypted work for a fair
use. 105
In RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc,106 the court granted
an injunction against the defendant's "VCR" product that was
programmed to trick the plaintiffs "RealNetwork" server
Millennium Copyright Act). Cf CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Greenleaf Electronics, Inc., 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7675 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding that defendant's cable television decoding
devices violated § 1201(a)(2) of the DMCA); RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (holding defendant's "VCR" product
circumvents anti-copying measure in violation of § 1201(b) and circumvents access
protection in violation of § 1201(a)(2)).
103 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d. at 322 n.159 (concluding defendants "have raised
a legitimate concern about the possible impact on traditional fair use of access control
measures in the digital era."). See generally Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
354, 421 (1999) (explaining DMCA allows copyright holders to "extinguish the privileges
reserved to users under background copyright law); NIMMER, supra note 9, at 738-40
(arguing that user exemption provisions in DMCA have failed to secure balance between
user and owner rights); Hannibal Travis, Comment, Pirates of the Information
Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copynght and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 777, 861 (2000) (criticizing DMCA for providing copyright holders with virtually
complete control over access and use of their works); Tiffany D. Trunko, Note, Remedies
for Copyright Infringement- Respecting the First Amendment, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1940,
1942 (1989) (proposing that courts bifurcate their analysis of liability and remedy in
copyright infringement cases).
104 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (explaining defendants were not sued for
copyright infringement, but rather for offering and providing technology designed to
circumvent technological measures that control access to copyrighted works and
otherwise violating Section 1201(a)(2) of the Act); see also Realnetworks, Inc. v.
Streambox, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *17 (2000) (stating that claims arising
under Section 1201 of DMCA occupy "a niche distinct from copyright infringement" and
are removed from Act's definition of copyright infringement). See generally Jason Sheets,
Copyright Misused: The Impact of the DMCA Anti-Circumvention Measures on Fair &
Innovative Markets, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 16-18 (2000) (concluding
legislative history of DMCA is "at best ambiguous, and at worse silent, on the availability
of the fair use defense for § 1201 claims.").
105 See Jonathan Dowell, Comment, Bytes and Pieces: Fragmented Copies, Licensing,
and Fair Use in a Digital World, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 843, 843 (1998) (concluding
"notwithstanding copyright owner's ostensible ability to license these uses cheaply, fair
use remains an essential tool to allow fragmented uses that will further copyright's major
policy goals"). See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (1992); Jessica Litman, Copyright and Technological Change, 68
OR. L. REV. 275 (1989); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyrigbt Law for the Information Age,
75 OR. L. REV. 19 (1996).
106 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
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computer into thinking the VCR was a "RealPlayer," a software
program located on an end-user's computer.107  Streambox
reverse engineered the RealPlayer software and accessed the
"secret handshake," a secret code comparable to CSS (in the same
manner that the defendants in Reimerdes decrypted CSS to
ascertain DeCSS), and determined the "secret handshake" that
assures files hosted on a RealServer are sent only to a
RealPlayer.108 The defendants were charged with violating §§
1201(a)(2) (circumventing access protection) and 1201(b)
(circumventing anticopying measure). 109
Streambox argued that the VCR permitted a consumer to make
a fair use of RealMedia files and as such is a lawful technological
device.110 The Court, though conceding that "Streambox's VCR is
entitled to the same 'fair use' protections the Supreme Court
afforded to video cassette recorders used for 'time-shifting' in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc... ,"I 11
107 See RealNetworks Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *34-35. The Streambox VCR
enabled end-users to access and download RealMedia files and store them on their
computers, rather than only accessing the streamed content while connected to a
RealServer. Id. at 10-11. Defendant Streambox argued that there were substantial non-
infringing uses of its product that would place it within the same fair use protections the
Supreme Court afforded to VCR's used for "time-shifting in Sony Corp. v. Universal
Studios. Id. at 21-22.
108 RealNetworks Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *6 (W.D. Wash. 2000). See Sega
Enterprises, LTD. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
Copyright Act permits persons who are neither copyright holders nor licensees to
disassemble copyrighted computer program in order to gain understanding of unprotected
functional elements of program as matter of law); see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo
of America, 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
109 See RealNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, *18 (W.D. Wash. 2000); see also
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d. at 319 (finding violation of 1201 (a)(2)(a) and 1201 (a)(1)(b)
and rejecting arguments citing defense exemptions); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and
Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1631 (2001)
(suggesting the purpose behind Congress's enactment of DMCA arose from attempt to
create new method of copyright, and focus on old markets).
110 See RealNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *21 (W.D. Wash. 2000). See
generally Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1682-1683 (1999)
(suggesting expansion of copyright exemptions affords too much latitude to Congress);
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an
Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561, 626 (2001) (suggesting 'reverse' fair
use analysis to address factors that should survive preemption by copyright).
III
The Sony decision turned[,l in large part[,] on a finding that substantial numbers
of copyright holders who broadcast their works either had authorized or would
not object to having their works time-shifted by private viewers. Here, by
contrast, copyright owners have specifically chosen to prevent the copying
enabled by the Streambox VCR putting their content on RealServers and leaving
the Copy Switch off...
Moreover, the Sony decision did not involve interpretation of the DMCA. Under
the DMCA, product developers do not have the right to distribute products that
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concluded that copyright owners who have elected not to have
their works copied, even though posted on RealServers, would
have their rights infringed if Streambox were allowed to
purposefully circumvent the Copy Switch technological measure
put in place by RealNetworks, which blocks copying of streaming
sound or video clips accessed by the consumer.11 2 The Court
therefore concluded that an injunction against the defendant's
VCR device would serve the public's interest because otherwise
copyright owners would be reluctant to make their audio and
visual works available on the Internet for fear that they could too
easily be appropriated in their entirety.'13
RECONCILING A SOLUTION
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,]14 the
Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that "time shifting"1 5 was a
circumvent technological measures that prevent consumers from gaining
unauthorized access to or making unauthorized copies of works protected by the
Copyright Act. Instead, Congress specifically prohibited the distribution of the
tools by which such circumvention could be accomplished. The portion of the
Streambox VCR that circumvents the technological measures that prevent
unauthorized access to and duplication of audio and video content therefore runs
afoul of the DMCA.
RealNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1889, at *22 (W.D. Wash. 2000). See Douglas L.
Rogers, Give the Smaller Players a Chance: Shaping the Digital Economy Through
Antitrust and Copyright Law, 5 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 13, 98 (2001) (discussing
court's explanation and differentiation of Sony). But see Los Angeles News Service v.
Tullo, 973 F.2d 791 (1992) (stating Sonys 'fair use' application could only extend to use of,
not selling of, copied material).
112 The Court reasoned that:
[u]nder the DMCA, a product or part thereof 'circumvents' protections afforded a
technological measure by 'avoiding[,] bypassing, removing, deactivating or
otherwise impairing' the operation of that technological measure. 17 U.S.C. §§
1201(b)(2)(A), 1201 (a)(2)(A). Under that definition, at least a part of the
Streambox VCR circumvents the technological measures RealNetworks affords to
copyright owners. Where a RealMedia files stored on a RealServer, the VCR
'bypasses' the secret handshake to gain access to the file. The VCR then
circumvents the Copy Switch, enabling a user to make a copy of a file that the
copyright owner had sought to protect.
ReaiNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *19-20 (citations included).
113 RealNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, 2000 at *26. See ACLU v. Reno, 31
F.Supp. 2d. 473, 498 (1999) (noting public interest in protecting the Internet); Rogers,
supra note 109, at 115 n.569 (citing Joint Explanatory Statement of Committee of
Conference on DMCA, H.R. REP. No. 105-796, at 64-65 (1998), suggesting goal of
protecting public interest is aided by private companies consultation and testing of
proposed technologies). But see Glynn S. Lundey, Jr. The Death of Copy7yght: Digital
Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millenuinm Copyight Act, 87 VA. L. REV.
813, 849 (2001) (suggesting anonymity overrides public interest in judicial determination
of fairness of private copying).
114 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984).
115 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 417 . After citing subcommittee hearing, the Court defined
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fair use of the plaintiff movie studios' copyrighted programs and
that Sony was not liable as a contributory infringer.116 The
movie studios alleged that home videotaping, made possible by
Sony's manufacture of the Betamax video tape recorder,
constituted an infringement of copyright."17 The Court rejected
this argument on the basis that under § 107(2), time shifting for
home use was not a commercial or profit-making purpose, and
must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.118
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that under § 107(4), the "effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work," the prohibition of such noncommercial uses
would merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing
benefit.'119 This landmark decision opened wide the home
entertainment market for videocassette tapes.120 Now, with the
advent of DVD players, it is submitted that the court's reasoning
"time shifting" as "the recording of a program that the VTR [video tape recorder,
precursor to the videocassette recorder (VCR)] owner cannot view as it is being televised
and the watching of the taped program at a later time. .." Sony, 464 U.S. at 417.
116 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 417; N.Y. Times Co v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 518 (2001)
(citing and explaining the court's ruling in Sony); Campbell v. Acruff-Rose Music, 510 U.S.
569, 574 (1994) (emphasizing weight of the Sonycourt's statement that "every commercial
use... is presumptively... unfair.")
117 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 417; Sonia Das, The Availability of the Fair Use Defense in
Music Piracy and InternetTechnology, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 727, 737 (2000) (comparing
Sony decisions with Encyclopaedia Britannica Education Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp.
1156, 1168-1169 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) in which videotaped copies of copyrighted publicly
broadcast television works by school board was not considered 'fair use' because of school
board's 'highly organized and systemic program" for copying). See generally A. Samuel
Oddi, Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort and Technological Tensions, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47 (1989) (comparing contributory infringement with tort theory).
118 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449, 454-455 (holding time shifting as fair use of copyrighted
material).
119 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-451 (reasoning that prohibiting noncommercial uses of
copyrighted work needlessly limits access to ideas). See generally Jonathon Bank &
Andrew J. McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A Peek Behind the Scenes at the Making of
Sony v. Universal City Studios, 17 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 427 (1994) (detailed
discussion of evolution of "Betamax" opinions); Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: The
Law and Lore of Copyight From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox, 149-57 (1994)
(tracing history and rationale of copyright and intellectual property right); Wendy J.
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1630 (1982) (suggesting fair use
should only be found where there is market failure).
120 See generally Randall E. Stross, Chill, Hollywood, Chill: Let The People Watch
What They Want When They Want To, U.S. NEWS, Oct. 2, 2000 at 46 (warning that as
digital media becomes more prominent, loss of noncommercial "fair use" is going to
become more manifest). But see Michael Himowitz, U.S. Law Limits Dgigtal Fair Use,
BALTIMORE SUN, Jul. 23, 2001 at 1 (explaining how DMCA limits right to fair use); Frank
Thorsberg and Tom Spring, New Shackles on Your CD, Video Copying, PC WORLD, Jan. 1,
2002 at 20 (describing entertainment industry efforts to use technology which conflicts
with consumer's right of fair use).
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is applicable to using digital technology to time shift digitally
broadcasted programs by recording them for later viewing, but
that the DMCA has not only banned fair use by outlawing
circumvention measures to access controls on digitally stored
copyrighted works, but that Sony has in some respects been
weakened as viable authority since defendants now have to avoid
violating the DMCA and not merely a charge of copyright
infringement. 121
The cases discussed thus far have not specifically involved an
exact replica of the facts of Sony Instead, they have involved
violations of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA.
Some commentators have argued that the enactment of the
DMCA means that Sony is not a viable defense for
manufacturers of decryption devices because it is the violation of
§ 1201 that manufacturers must avoid, and not a charge of
contributory copyright infringement. 122  This contention is
literally true in the sense that the defendants in cases like
Reimerdes and RealNetworks were charged with violating the
anti-circumvention provisions of § 1201 of the DMCA and not
with contributory infringement.123 Yet this contention must not
be taken out of context or be interpreted too broadly: the DMCA
bars technological measures used to circumvent access controls
121 See 1 NIMMERON COPYRIGHT (1999 Supp.), § 12A.181B]:
ITIhose who manufacture equipment and products generally can no longer gauge
their conduct as permitted or forbidden by reference to the Sony doctrine. For a
given piece of machinery might qualify as a stable [sic] item of commerce, with a
substantial noninfringing use, and hence be immune from attack under Sonys
construction of the Copyright Act - but nonetheless still be subject to suppression
under Section 1201 ... [E]quipment manufacturers in the twenty-first century
will need to vet their products for compliance with Section 1201 in order to avoid
a circumvention claim, rather than under Sony to negate a copyright claim.
[T]hose who manufacture equipment and products generally can no longer gauge
their conduct as permitted or forbidden by reference to the Sony doctrine. For a
given piece of machinery might qualify as a stable [sic item of commerce, with a
substantial noninfringing use, and hence be immune from attack under Sonys
construction of the Copyright Act - but nonetheless still be subject to suppression
under Section 1201 ... [E]quipment manufacturers in the twenty-first century
will need to vet their products for compliance with Section 1201 in order to avoid
a circumvention claim, rather than under Sony to negate a copyright claim.
122 See id.
123 See Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d, at 322. (highlighting that defendants were not
sued for copyright infringement); see also Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc. v. Redd Home,
Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 1984) (requiring defendant act in concert with infringer
and know of infringing activity). But cf RealNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at
21-22 (conceding that "Streambox's VCR is entitled to the same 'fair use' protections the
Supreme Court afforded to video cassette recorders used for 'time-shifting' in Sony).
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on digitally stored copyrighted materials. 2 4 In its purpose, the
DMCA was meant to prevent overt appropriation of copyrighted
works, especially of CDs and DVDs on the Internet, and
Reimerdes and RealNetworks involve cases where the defendants
violated the statutory provisions of the DMCA directly and hence
were held liable for it. Surely Sony should not cease to be viable
authority just because the newly enacted provisions of the DMCA
ban circumvention measures in their aim to stop overt
appropriation of copyrighted works. The DMCA does not seem to
have been enacted to overrule Sony by banning home use of
"time-shifting" for digital recording.125  If it were, it would
directly and expressly be eradicating the fair use doctrine for
good, which would provide more than an ample amount of fodder
for this Note to be redundant. Instead, it is the implicit ban on
anti-circumvention measures that spells the shrinking of the fair
use doctrine as applied to digital media. For the DMCA itself, as
a response to overt appropriation of CDs and DVDs on the
Internet, has stamped out fair use for now as a response to this
mass appropriation, and in turn has weakened claims of "home
use" "time-shifting" that Sony has stood for in the last two
decades of the twentieth century.
CONCLUSION
The fair use doctrine historically has stood the test of time as it
has been applied to new technologies that have completely
changed the way in which copyright infringement has been
committed. From the invention of the printing press to the
124 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) states in part:
(1)No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that -
(D) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing
protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of
a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof,
(E) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other to
circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion
thereof; or
(F) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person
with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under
this title in a work or a portion thereof.
125 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998).
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mimeograph to the photocopier, and today with the digital
technology accessible via the Internet, the fair use doctrine is
again withstanding these ever more efficient and cheaper ways
in which copying is performed.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act has swiftly struck down
copyright pirates on the Internet. It is an adequate and
appropriate law by which Congress has decided to deal with
Internet piracy. However, as noted herein, the perpetual
pendulum that swings between the fair use rights of individuals,
as part of Congress' mandate "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts. .. "126 and Congress' power to confer
upon authors a limited monopoly on their writings, has started
with an unusually strong momentum towards the monopoly side.
Although it may be too soon at the start of this new century to
tell whether fair use will survive yet another new technological
breakthrough, this Note has attempted to function as a prescient
porthole into the high-speed, digital world that we are rapidly
coming into. It is only with a look back at the constitutional
safeguards and judicial precedents that have propelled us thus
far that we can take the fair use rights of individuals with us into
the new millennium.
126 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, di. 8.
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